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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S DRAFT
PROPOSAL TO BYPASS THE AGGREGATE
SETTLEMENT RULE: DO MASS TORT CLIENTS
NEED (OR WANT) GROUP DECISION MAKING?
Nancy J. Moore*
INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute (ALI) recently undertook an entirely
new project: Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.' The
Principles aim "to recommend procedures for aggregate lawsuits that
will enable civil justice systems to handle these cases better."'2 Al-
though the bulk of the project is devoted to class actions, a number of
sections address various forms of non-class aggregations, including
non-class aggregate settlements. 3
Judges and scholars have given considerably less attention to non-
class aggregations than to class actions. 4 Nevertheless, various cases,
ethics opinions, and articles have addressed a number of issues that
commonly arise in these lawsuits, primarily in connection with the ap-
plication of the so-called "aggregate settlement rule." Rule 1.8(g) of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which every U.S. ju-
risdiction has adopted in various forms,5 limits lawyers' abilities to
participate "in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or
against the clients" without the clients' informed consent after they
have been advised of "the existence and nature of all the claims or
pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settle-
ment."'6 Questions have been raised concerning the interpretation of
* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
1. This Article comments on proposals set forth in the two drafts that preceded the Thirteenth
Annual Clifford Symposium. See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITI-
GATION (Discussion Draft No. 2, Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL]; AM. L.
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Preliminary Draft No. 4, Sept. 21,
2006) [hereinafter ALl PRELIM. DRAFT No. 4].
2. AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION XV (Preliminary Draft No. 2, Apr.
20, 2005).
3. See ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 1.02 cmt. a. Judges and scholars have given
considerably less attention to non-class aggregations than to class actions.
4. Id.
5. Id. § 3.15 cmt. b.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2007).
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this rule, including the following: What constitutes an aggregate set-
tlement? What is the nature and amount of information that the law-
yer must disclose? May clients waive their right to learn what other
clients will receive? Most importantly, may a group of clients agree in
advance to whatever settlement either the lawyer or a portion of the
group approves? 7
Neither the text of the rule nor its comment defines an "aggregate
settlement,"8 and courts and ethics committees have disagreed on an
authoritative definition. 9 Based largely on an article by Howard Er-
ichson, 10 the ALI reporters propose to broadly define aggregate set-
tlements to include settlements of multiple claims when "the
defendant's acceptance of the settlement is contingent upon the ac-
ceptance by a specified percentage of the claimants" or "the value of
each [claimant's] claim is not based solely on individual case-by-case
facts and negotiations." I I Given the persistent problem of determin-
ing which settlements are covered by the aggregate settlement rule,' 2
the reporters should be commended for what appears to be both a
principled and workable definition.
As for the nature and amount of information a lawyer must dis-
close, recent changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
clarify that, when a lawyer participates in an aggregate settlement, she
must inform each client "about all the material terms of the settle-
ment, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settle-
ment or plea offer is accepted."' 13 Questions remain, however,
concerning the level of detail lawyers must provide-for example,
whether the lawyer must disclose the names of the other clients when
7. See generally Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in
Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149 (1999); Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Law-
suits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997).
8. See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006) [hereinafter ABA
Formal Op. 06-438].
9. Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769
(2005).
10. See id. (cited in ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.16 Reporters' Notes cmt. a).
11. ALl DRAFT' PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.16(a)-(b).
12. For example, some authorities define an aggregate settlement narrowly to mean only "an
all-or-nothing total settlement of a single sum of money for all claims pending for a group of
plaintiffs." Erichson, supra note 9, at 1783 (quoting Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal
Op. 2000-158, at n.1 (2000)). Others define it more broadly to include any settlement "when two
or more clients consent to have their matters resolved together." ABA Formal Op. 06-438,
supra note 8, at 1.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(g) cmt. 13 (2007). This paragraph, entitled
"Aggregate Settlements," was added at the recommendation of the ABA Commission on Evalu-
ating the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Ethics 2000 Commission"). I was the Chief Reporter
for the Ethics 2000 Commission.
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those clients prefer that details of their medical conditions remain
confidential. The ALI Draft Proposal ("Proposal") does not specifi-
cally address this question,' 4 but it should be possible for a client's
desire for privacy to be respected, unless other clients need particular
identifying information in order to evaluate the fairness of the settle-
ment allocation.' 5
The possibility of client waiver-either of the right to receive infor-
mation about other clients' participation or the right to reject a settle-
ment offer after learning of its terms-is not mentioned in either the
rule or the comment. Yet numerous cases and ethics opinions have
addressed the effectiveness of advance waivers and have uniformly
rejected an interpretation of the current rule that would permit
them. 16 Nevertheless, the reporters propose that the aggregate settle-
ment rule should be modified to facilitate advance waivers, allowing a
portion of the group to decide how settlement funds should be allo-
cated. This Proposal is seriously flawed and should be rejected in
favor of the continued viability of the aggregate settlement rule.
The ALI Draft Proposal-which may be modified prior to final sub-
mission to ALI members-creates two major exceptions to the aggre-
gate settlement rule. The first exception applies when the total value
of the aggregated claims is more than $5 million and the total number
of claimants is forty or more.' 7 In such circumstances, § 3.17 allows
14. Section 3.17 provides that, under the current aggregate settlement rule, each client must
give "informed consent, in writing, after reviewing the settlements of all other persons subject to
the aggregate settlement." ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(a). Subsection (a) ap-
pears to endorse the ABA interpretation of the aggregate settlement rule, which requires a num-
ber of specific disclosures, including "[t]he details of every other client's participation in the
aggregate settlement." Id. § 3.17 Reporters' Notes cmt. a (discussing ABA Formal Op. 06-438,
supra note 8). Yet neither the ABA interpretation nor the comment itself specifies whether or
under what circumstances the name of every other client is among the details that must be
disclosed.
15. Moore, supra note 7, at 162-64. But cf Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 757-58 (lawyers
who do not disclose plaintiffs' names assume the risk that judges will determine that their inter-
pretation of the ambiguous rule is incorrect).
16. See, e.g.. Tax Auth.. Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006) (discussing cases
and commentary interpreting both Model Rule 1.8(g) and its predecessor, Model Code DR 5-
106). Because this was an issue of first impression in New Jersey, the court applied its holding
prospectively and enforced an aggregate settlement against a group of plaintiffs that had previ-
ously agreed "to be bound by a weighted majority vote." Id. at 523. The court also noted the
proposal of some commentators that Rule 1.8(g) "be changed to accommodate mass lawsuits"
and referred the issue to the New Jersey Commission on Ethics Reform for review and recom-
mendation to the court. Id. At the request of the Commission's chair, I communicated my own
views to the Commission, urging that the aggregate settlement rule be retained in its current
form.
17. ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(e).
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individual claimants, after consultation with counsel,", to "agree in ad-
vance to be bound in a proposed settlement by the collective decision-
making of 75 percent of the claimants," or, "if the settlement
significantly distinguishes among different categories of claimants, a
separate 75 percent vote of each category of claimants" approves the
settlement.1 9 The clients 20 may waive their "right to prior knowledge
of and consent to the terms of all other claimants' settlements"' 2 -
that is, of the client's rights under the current aggregate settlement
rule-as part of the original retention agreement or at any subsequent
time in writing. 22 Section 3.18 provides for limited judicial review of
aggregate settlements approved as a result of such waivers, but only if
the claimant brings the challenge "within 90 days of receiving actual
notice of the consummation of a settlement. ' 23 Even then, the re-
viewing court may declare the settlement unenforceable as to any
claimant only if it finds either that the challenger's waiver was not
18. The Proposal provides a lengthy and detailed list of the matters that must be disclosed by
the lawyer in order to communicate "adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of, and reasonably available alternatives to, the proposed [waiver]." Id. § 3.17(d).
19. Id. § 3.17(b).
20. The ALl Draft Proposal refers to "claimants," see supra note 17 and accompanying text,
whereas the aggregate settlement rule refers to "clients." see supra note 6 and accompanying
text. I use the terms interchangeably, although I have attempted to use the term "clients" as
much as possible to emphasize the fundamental distinction between claimants who have formal
attorney-client contracts and claimants who are merely absent members of a class. On occasion,
I also refer to "plaintiffs" and "plaintiffs' counsel." Although the aggregate settlement rules
apply to both plaintiff and defendant groups, the ALl Draft Proposal is clearly directed to set-
tling the claims of actual or potential plaintiffs.
21. ALI PRELIM. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.17(c). The quoted language does not appear
in the ALI Draft Proposal, either in the text or the comment. Nevertheless, the current text of
the proposal refers to the required consent as a "waiver," and it is clear that the client is waiving
her rights under the aggregate settlement rule. ALI DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(d).
The prior draft did not provide for approval by either a majority or supermajority. Instead, the
first exception under that draft permitted a client to waive existing rights under the aggregate
settlement rule as long as they consented, after disclosure, to "accept an aggregate settlement as
part of a known collective representation." ALl PRELIM. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.17(c).
This proposal would have permitted the lawyer alone to decide to accept the settlement on the
client's behalf, even though the lawyer had a significant financial interest not only in having an
aggregate settlement approved regardless of its overall fairness, but also in allocating the pro-
ceeds in a manner that favors certain claimants over others. See infra Part III. The only protec-
tion against unfair allocations was a provision for very limited judicial review of the settlements
by claimants bringing a challenge "within 90 days of receiving actual notice of the consummation
of a settlement." ALI PRELIM. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.18(a). Even then, claimants
could challenge enforcement of the settlement only if the court found either that the settlement
was "grossly unfair or inadequate to the challenger" or that the challenger's waiver was not
adequately informed. Id. § 3.18(d). The reviewing court was required to "give substantial defer-
ence to the settlement" and "treat it as presumptively fair and reasonable." Id. § 3.18(c). For a
discussion of the deficiencies of this proposal, see infra Part V.
22. ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(c).
23. ALI PRELIM. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.18(a).
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adequately informed or that either of the two requirements under
§ 3.18(c) was not met.2 4
The second exception applies if lawyers have not obtained effective
waivers. Under § 3.19, a lawyer "who receives an offer for a lump-
sum settlement of interdependent claims may seek approval for the
fairness and adequacy of such a settlement before a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in the state where the original attorney-client agree-
ment was formed. ' 25 Here, the lawyer has the burden not only to
prove the fairness and adequacy of the proposed settlement, but also
to establish "that efforts to secure direct approval from clients were
unavailing and why the terms of § 3.17 could not be satisfied without
judicial approval. ' 26 In other words, the lawyer "must provide a com-
pelling explanation for why a waiver was not secured pursuant to
§ 3.17."27
The reporters give two separate reasons for relaxing the aggregate
settlement rule. First, they state that "[t]he purpose of modifying the
strict requirements of the aggregate-settlement rule is to facilitate
large-scale settlements in situations where the aggregate-settlement
rule has impeded a substantial multiparty settlement. ' 28 According to
the reporters, the current rule undermines such settlements by permit-
ting individual clients "to exercise unfair control over a proposed set-
tlement and to demand premiums in exchange for approval. ' 29 The
reporters further argue that, although the current rule assumes that
claimants need to review all of the terms before making an informed
decision, "giving veto power to each claimant individually (as opposed
to collectively) is not necessary to ensure the fairness of aggregate
settlements. ' 30 In other words, the reporters assert that modifications
24. Id. § 3.18(c). For a discussion of a very different proposal for judicial review in an earlier
draft, see supra note 20 and infra Part V.
25. ALI DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.19(a). The proposal further provides that,
before invoking this alternative procedure, "claimants' counsel must use all reasonable efforts to
notify all affected claimants and provide such claimants an opportunity to participate in the
judicial proceedings." Id. § 3.19(b). The proposal does not currently specify what should be
included in the notice. For example, it is unclear whether the notice must disclose all of the
information regarding the settlement terms that would ordinarily be required under the aggre-
gate settlement rule. Additionally, the proposal does not specify how to identify the state in
which the original attorney-client agreement was formed or how the lawyer should proceed if
more than one state is involved-for example, where the relationship is found to have been
formed in the state where each client resides, and multiple clients reside in different states.
26. Id. § 3.19(a).
27. Id. § 3.19 cmt. b.
28. Id. § 3.17 cmt. b.
29. Id. § 3.17 cmt. a.
30. Id. This statement mischaracterizes the effect of the aggregate settlement rule. Individual
claimants do not have a veto over the settlements approved by others unless the defendant
2008]
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are necessary to encourage multi-party settlements and that such
modifications will not harm individual claimants by promoting inade-
quate or unfair settlements. Second, the reporters note that
"[w]aivers of important rights are valid in a variety of areas, including
the most cherished constitutional rights. ' 31 As a result, they "reject[ ]
the view that individual decisionmaking over the settlement of a claim
is so uniquely important that it cannot be subject to a contractual
waiver in favor of group decisionmaking, provided that there is a
supermajority-approval requirement. '32 That rationale is not fleshed
out in the Proposal as such, but ALI Reporter Charles Silver and his
coauthor, Lynn Baker, defend the view that refusing to permit clients
to adopt procedures they prefer is unnecessarily paternalistic. 33
ALI Principles, unlike Restatements, do not necessarily reflect the
law as it presently stands, but rather "assume the stance of expressing
the law as it should be."'34 As a result, critics would be unable to criti-
cize the proposal on the ground that the aggregate settlement rule
cannot plausibly be interpreted to permit waivers of the type de-
scribed in § 3.17.35 Nevertheless, given that the rule emerged un-
scathed during the Ethics 2000 Commission's wide-ranging review of
the ABA Model Rules,3 6 as well as during the individual state reviews
that followed in its wake, 37 surely the burden is on the reporters to
requires unanimous approval for the settlement to be effective. See infra notes 48-49 and ac-
companying text.
31. ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(a) cmt. a.
32. Id.
33. See Silver & Baker, supra note 7: Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The
Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465 (1998).
34. The ALI Projects Overview, www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.main (last visited
Sept. 15, 2007).
35. See id. (describing how restatements "aim at clear formulations of common law and its
statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently stands or might plausibly be
stated by a court").
36. The only change the Ethics 2000 Commission recommended was the adoption of an en-
tirely new comment. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
37. According to an ABA chart noting state departures from the new Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility text, most states have adopted the text of Rule 1.8(g) without modification,
and the changes that have been made are relatively minor and do not relate to the issues ad-
dressed in the reporters' proposal. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Charts
Comparing Professional Conduct Rules as Adopted by States to ABA Model Rules, http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/Jclr/charts.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (noting minor changes in the rule text
in the following jurisdictions: the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, North Dakota,
Ohio, and Washington). One state, New York, will consider a proposal to revise the rule to
provide that, with court approval, a lawyer need not follow the rule's requirement for fully in-
formed consent. See Rule 1.8: Current Clients: Special Conflict of Interest Rules, http://www.
nysba.org/Content/ContentGroups/COSACReport/COSACProposed-Rules-ofProfessional_
Conduct.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). The comment does not address this proposed change,
and it is not entirely clear that the proposal is meant to apply outside of the class action context.
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make a persuasive case for change. In my view, neither rationale of-
fered by the reporters meets that burden.
Part II of this Article argues that the reporters have not demon-
strated that the aggregate settlement rule is a significant impediment
to settlement in mass lawsuits. 38 Part III then explains how the rule
protects clients against the risks of inadequate settlements and unfair
allocations. 39 Part IV asserts that the proposed supermajority ap-
proval requirement provides insufficient alternative protection, be-
cause there are many ways in which a settlement agreement may be
unfairly biased toward specific groups without triggering the Propo-
sal's requirement of supermajority approval within each formal cate-
gory of cases created by the agreement.40 Next, Part V demonstrates
how reinstating an earlier proposal for a limited fairness hearing
would not fix that problem.4' Part VI turns to the reporters' argument
that ex ante waivers are necessary to honor client preferences and cli-
ent autonomy. 42 Here, it is argued that waivers obtained under the
Draft Proposal are not likely to reflect true client preferences.
Part VII argues that the reporters' Draft Proposal, not the aggre-
gate settlement rule, is a radical departure from the current law of
lawyering.4 3 That law, which is reflected in the ALI's recently
adopted Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, offers
considerable protection to clients in the form of nonwaiveable rights
to void agreements likely to have been made on the basis of a lack of
information, unequal bargaining power, or coercion. The reporters'
Draft Proposal is particularly problematic, because it contemplates an
advance waiver of clients' rights under the aggregate settlement rule.
It is unlikely that an attorney could provide disclosure at the outset of
the representation that would be adequate for unsophisticated mass
tort clients to reasonably understand the material risks that such waiv-
ers entail. Part VIII examines the Draft Proposal's provision for judi-
cial approval of an aggregate settlement in circumstances where the
attorney is unable to satisfy the supermajority approval requirements
and finds that this provision is both unexplained and unjustified.4 4 Fi-
If the change applies to non-class aggregated settlements, it is unclear how judicial approval
would be sought for the settlement of unfiled claims or what standards courts would use to
approve settlements that do not meet the requirements of the aggregate settlement rule.
38. See infra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 118-139 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
2008]
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nally, Part IX summarizes these arguments and concludes that the
ALI Draft Proposal is seriously defective in its efforts to allow plain-
tiffs' lawyers to bypass the aggregate settlement rule through ex ante
waivers or otherwise. 45
II. CLIENT WAIVERS ARE NOT NECESSARY TO SECURE
SUBSTANTIAL MULTI-PARTY SETTLEMENTS
Citing one of several articles by Silver and Baker, the Reporters'
Notes to § 3.15 state that some scholars have recognized "that the ag-
gregate settlement rule imposes onerous restrictions that impede fair
and legitimate settlements of [a] large number of claims."' 46  Else-
where in the Draft Proposal, the reporters suggest two reasons why
they believe the rule is not workable in mass lawsuits: first, the possi-
bility of strategic holdouts;47 and second, the burden of obtaining con-
sent after full disclosure.48 Other than Silver and Baker, the reporters
cite no authority for their contention that the aggregate settlement
rule constitutes a significant impediment to settlement in mass
lawsuits.
The reporters' concern for strategic holdouts appears to be based
on their belief that, under the aggregate settlement rule, each individ-
ual client has a "veto power" over the effectiveness of the aggregate
settlement.49 But this belief is inaccurate. Rule 1.8(g) requires only
that the lawyer not purport to accept an aggregate settlement on be-
half of a group of clients unless each of those clients has given fully
informed consent to its terms. Nothing prevents the lawyer from ne-
45. See infra Part IX.
46. ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL. supra note 1, § 3.15 Reporters' Notes to cmt. b (citing Silver &
Baker. supra note 7. at 755-66). The reporters also note that "[slome scholars have offered a
strong endorsement of the aggregate settlement rule and oppose arguments to ease its require-
nients." d. (citing Moore. supra note 7). See also Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Ac-
tion: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 519.
47. See ALl DRAFr PROPOSAL. supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt. a ("Current law prohibits waiving
individual-claimant settlement decisionmaking, thereby empowering individual claimants to ex-
ercise unfair control over a proposed settlement and to demand premiums in exchange for
approval.").
48. See id. § 3.17 cmt. b ("[I]n a ... case involving a small number of claimants, the aggregate-
settlement rule is easy to administer and poses little practical difficulties for the lawyer repre-
senting multiple claimants. The same is not true, however, for a lawyer representing hundreds of
asbestos clients and negotiating multi-million dollar settlements."). See also ALl PRELIM.
DRAFT No. 4. supra note 1. § 3.18 cmt. a ("The requirements of disclosure and consent can be
very burdensome when there are numerous claimants.").
49. See AlI DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt. a (stating that the aggregate settle-
ment rule renders settlements ineffective unless "each client gives informed consent, in writing,
after reviewing the settlements of all other persons subject to the aggregate settlement").
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gotiating a tentative settlement agreement that will become binding
only as to those clients who accept its terms after the required full
disclosure. 50
Strategic holdouts might be a problem if unanimity is required
before a settlement can become effective as to any of the clients, but
neither the reporters nor Silver and Baker cite empirical information
indicating how often defendants insist on structuring settlements so
that "even a single plaintiff's refusal to consent to a settlement could
scuttle the settlement for the other plaintiffs. '51 Under the aggregate
settlement rule, it is unethical for a common attorney to seek advance
approval from clients of settlement terms agreed to either by the law-
yer alone or by a portion of the group.5 2 As a result, defendants
should be satisfied with a "walk-away provision [that] gives the defen-
dant the right to abandon the settlement if more than a certain per-
centage of plaintiffs decline their offers."'53  According to one
plaintiffs' lawyer, an acceptance rate of 90% is often used.54 Defend-
ants do not typically expect 100% of class members in an opt-out class
action to agree to a proposed settlement; therefore, they should not be
expected to require unanimity in the typical non-class mass lawsuit. 55
If the facts are otherwise, there ought to be some way to demonstrate
how often this occurs. 56
50. See Moore, supra note 7, at 164-66.
51. Michael J. Maloney & Allison Taylor Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of Interna-
tional Litigation: "Where Angels Fear to Tread," 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 933, 963 (1995). Indeed,
Silver and Baker have conceded that, "because the possibility of holdouts is obvious, defendants
typically demand acceptance rates of less than 100%." Silver & Baker, supra note 33, at 1532.
As a result, this "denies an individual plaintiff the power unilaterally to block a group-wide
deal." Id.
52. See Maloney & Blizzard, supra note 51, at 963-64.
53. Erichson, supra note 46, at 534.
54. See id. at 534 n.52 and accompanying text (citing Paul Rheingold, a well-known plaintiffs'
lawyer). Erichson discussed a variation in which "100 percent of the most serious category of
claimants and 90 percent of the remainder" must accept the settlement for it to be effective. Id.
at 534. In this variation, any of the most seriously injured claimants would be in a position to act
strategically. It is important to understand how a walk-away provision requiring something like
90% claimant approval differs from the 75% supermajority approval required under the ALl
Draft Proposal. In a walk-away provision, the 90% approval is required before the settlement is
effective as to any claimant, but once 90% approval is achieved, it binds only those claimants
who voted in favor of the settlement. In the ALl Draft Proposal, however, once the 75% ap-
proval is obtained, the settlement also binds those who voted against it, so long as they signed an
advance waiver agreeing to be bound by the 75% collective vote. See supra note 19 and accom-
panying text.
55. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 46. at 574 ("[Wlalk-away provisions generally do not re-
quire 100 percent acceptance of the settlement.").
56. As Silver and Baker have noted, walk-away provisions are "sources of transaction costs,"
because neither defendants nor the common attorney can be certain how many plaintiffs will
consent. Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 765. But merely because they are the source of trans-
2008]
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Even when unanimity is required, an individual plaintiff's ability to
act strategically may be limited. For example, a common attorney can
reduce the possibility of holdouts by clarifying at the outset that the
individual offers are "take it or leave it" and that no one will receive a
premium in exchange for approving the settlement.57 Once it is clear
that no premium is available, individual plaintiffs will reject the offer
only when they believe that they can do better by continuing with the
litigation. When this happens, the defendant can still come back with
an offer to settle the remainder of the attorney's cases, leaving the
holdout plaintiff isolated and forced to continue her case at her own
expense.58
As for the burden of obtaining informed consent after full disclo-
sure of the settlement's terms, attorneys can take numerous steps in
mass tort cases to accomplish the required disclosure. For example,
attorneys can-and do-keep their clients informed by using a combi-
nation of group meetings, mass emails, dedicated websites, toll-free
numbers, and paralegals. 59 Given the amount of legal fees plaintiffs'
attorneys expect to make in mass lawsuits,60 they should be willing-
action costs does not mean that defendants will not use walk-away provisions, and it is still
unclear whether there are a significant number of mass lawsuits that should settle, but do not.
because the defendants cannot obtain unanimity. In the absence of such information, observers
should not simply assume that the costs of the current rule outweigh its benefits.
57. Indeed, paying any such "premiums" may be evidence that an attorney has acted unethi-
cally by favoring some clients over others. See, e.g.. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7
cmt. 29 (2007) (requiring attorneys to be impartial towards commonly represented clients).
Plaintiffs' attorneys can also reduce the likelihood of strategic holdouts by developing the attor-
ney-client relationship-in other words, "by regularly providing plaintiffs with as much informa-
tion as possible about the progress of the lawsuit and affording them opportunities to consult
regularly with members of the lawyer's staff (and occasionally with the lawyer as well)." Moore,
supra note 7, at 165 n.98 (citing an interview with a lawyer from a well-known plaintiffs' law
firm).
58. Lawyers may be able to structure representation in advance in a way that makes wide-
spread approval of an aggregate settlement more likely-for example, by having clients "tenta-
tively agree" to follow the wishes of a majority even though they are not required to do so. This
may go far to encourage loyalty to the group. Moore, supra note 7, at 165. It might also be
possible to ask prospective clients to agree that, if the client rejects a settlement offer approved
by the requisite majority, the lawyer may withdraw and continue representing the majority. Id.
(noting that Rule 1.2(c) permits lawyers to limit the scope of representation with the client's
informed consent). Whether such restrictions constitute an undue burden on the client's right to
approve settlements is not entirely clear. In any event, in the absence of such an agreement, a
lawyer does not have a unilateral right to withdraw merely because the client refuses to accept a
settlement offer that the lawyer has recommended. See, e.g., Augustson v. Linea Aerea Na-
cional-Chile S.A., 76 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1996).
59. See Moore, supra note 7. at 160-62.
60. Legal fees in mass lawsuits are typically larger on a per capita basis than in class actions,
because of the individual contingent fee retainer agreements. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on
the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
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and expected-to devote considerable resources to these cases.6'
Even if the aggregate settlement rule requires the attorney to contact
the clients twice-once to obtain their consent to the settlement and
then again to give them their checks62-there is no evidence that such
contacts are unduly burdensome, 63 keeping in mind that the attorneys
are supposed to keep their clients reasonably informed throughout the
litigation.64 The case has not yet been made that such methods of
informing clients are unrealistic for the majority or even a significant
number of mass tort lawsuits in which an aggregate settlement is likely
the best result for most claimants. 65
In any event, under the ALI Draft Proposal, the lawyer must effec-
tively notify at least 75% of the clients, whose approval will not count
toward the supermajority requirement unless they have received de-
tailed information regarding the proposed settlement. 66 As a result,
the burden should be measured only by the incremental cost of notify-
ing the remainder of the clients.67
650, 661 & n.57 (2002) (comparing the typical fee award of 25% in class action cases with the
standard 33% to 40% contingent fee).
61. For example, in Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999), lawyers representing 126
plaintiffs settled a mass tort lawsuit for $190 million, collecting attorneys' fees of $60 million. It
is unclear whether lawyers are entitled to charge the costs of communication to clients rather
than to themselves-in other words, whether these costs are more like ordinary litigation costs,
which are chargeable to clients, or overhead, which is chargeable to the lawyer. In any event,
even if those costs are ultimately chargeable to clients, the cost per client is justifiable and un-
likely to substantially detract from the amount of the award each client will receive.
62. See Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 764.
63. The inquiry should not focus on absolute cost, but rather on cost in relation to anticipated
fees or net client awards.
64. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)-(4) (2007) (a lawyer must "reasona-
bly consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accom-
plished," "keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter," and "promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information"). Another way to keep far-flung clients in-
formed is to use local referring attorneys, who can be expected to maintain closer relationships
with the clients than the common attorney can. See Moore, supra note 7, at 161-62.
65. Silver and Baker have argued that requiring clients to consent to the terms of the settle-
ment may entail undue delay in effectuating a mass settlement. See Silver & Baker, supra note
7, at 763-64. But, once again, aside from a single anecdotal account, the authors offer no evi-
dence that the delay entailed under the aggregate settlement rule is sufficiently problematic to
warrant modification. After all, there must necessarily be some delay in approving class action
settlements: members of the class must be notified and, in most instances, given an opportunity
to opt out. Nevertheless, defendants routinely settle class actions in order to achieve as much
finality as possible. Defendants may prefer to avoid such delays if they can, but there is no
indication that they will be unwilling to settle mass tort lawsuits if their preferences are not
honored.
66. ALl DRAFt PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.18(a).
67. To ensure 75% approval, the lawyer must effectively notify more than 75% of the claim-
ants. In all likelihood, the lawyer will want to notify as many claimants as she can, in which case
it is not clear that the ALl Draft Proposal significantly reduces the burdens of the current notifi-
cation requirement.
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Aside from communication costs, the reporters may be concerned
about the burden on some clients when the private details of their
settlements are shared, including sensitive information regarding med-
ical diagnoses and prognoses. Silver and Baker argued that "the emo-
tional and other costs to the plaintiffs of these invasions of privacy
may well exceed any benefits of having information about other group
members' claims and anticipated settlement payments" and that this
warrants permitting claimants to waive the disclosure requirements of
the aggregate settlement rule.68
The ALI Draft Proposal does not clarify whether the amount of
detailed information that at least 75% of the clients must receive is
the same as or different from the information required under the ag-
gregate settlement rule. Section 3.17 specifies only that claimants
must be informed of the following: the total amount of the settlement
offer; the total costs and attorneys' fees; the manner in which the set-
tlement will be divided; the category into which the claimant has been
placed, if that determination has already been made; and the existence
of related and unrelated claims held by claimants represented by the
same lawyer that will not be covered by the settlement.69 It is cer-
tainly plausible to interpret the proposal as reducing the amount of
information each client must receive regarding the details of other cli-
ents' settlements, which would indeed reduce the burden of disclo-
sure. Whether this change is justifiable is another matter entirely.
III. AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS PRESENT THE RISK OF
INADEQUATE AWARDS AND UNFAIR ALLOCATIONS
The rationale of the aggregate settlement rule is the necessity of
giving an opportunity to review the terms of an aggregate settlement
before making an informed decision to avoid binding them to inade-
quate settlements and unfair allocations.70 In defending their propo-
68. Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 756-59.
69. ALl DRAFI" PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(d)(4).
70. See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 749-53 (identifying and discussing dangers attrib-
utable to "attorney opportunism" and "allocation conflicts" among plaintiffs and then conclud-
ing that "the purpose of Rule 1.8(g) is to enable each plaintiff to police allocation conflicts by
vetoing a proposed settlement"). The ALI Draft Proposal does not make that rationale clear:
The aggregate-settlement rule is based on the view that, without reviewing and analyz-
ing the existence and nature of all claims and of the participation of each person in a
proposed settlement, including but not limited to all proposed settlement terms, a
claimant cannot make an informed decision whether to agree to a proposed aggregate
settlement.
ALI DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt. a. The proposal does not clearly identify and
address what Professors Silver and Baker have previously identified as the additional risks of
attorney opportunism and allocation conflicts in mass lawsuits or the decreased incentives for
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sal to modify the current rule, the reporters assert that "giving veto
power to each claimant individually ... is not necessary to ensure the
fairness of aggregate settlements."' 71 As noted above, this statement
mischaracterizes the effect of the aggregate settlement rule, because
individual clients do not have the ability to veto an aggregate settle-
ment unless the defendant has insisted upon unanimous approval
before the settlement will be effective. 72 Although the reporters tac-
itly acknowledge that the purpose of the current rule is to prevent
unfair settlements, they do not explain why the rationale given for the
current rule is mistaken or how supermajority approval serves as an
adequate alternative. Thus, it is important to see how the aggregate
settlement rule currently serves as a necessary constraint on both in-
adequate settlements and unfair allocations.
Aggregate settlements might be inadequate in their total amounts,
because the common attorney may accept "a relatively cheap settle-
ment that would nonetheless pay the attorney a handsome premium
on his or her hourly rate. '7 3 When individual clients review the
amounts they will receive under an aggregate settlement, they per-
form an important monitoring function that checks this form of attor-
ney opportunism. Under a prior draft proposal, advance waivers
would have allowed the attorney alone to bind clients to an aggregate
settlement negotiated by the attorney. 74 This proposal was defective,
because it would have entirely eliminated the monitoring function of
the current rule. Requiring a supermajority of the group to approve
the settlement before it becomes binding on other group members is
an improvement, because it reduces the likelihood of attorney oppor-
tunism by allowing at least 75% of the group to perform its current
monitoring function.
This explanation,75 however, assumes that the claims of the
supermajority are typical of the claims of the group as a whole. If
individual group members to closely monitor their lawyers given that, in mass lawsuits, "moni-
toring is a public good." Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 752.
71. ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt a.
72. See Silver & Baker, supra note 33, at 1532.
73. Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 751 (characterizing the problem as one of "attorney
opportunism").
74. See ALI PRELIM. DRAF No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.17(c). The only protection offered to
claimants against inadequate settlements was limited judicial review of the adequacy and fairness
of the settlement. See infra Part IV.
75. Interestingly, this is not the explanation the reporters give for imposing the supermajority
approval requirement. Instead, the reporters only allude to the fact that another rationale of the
current rule is to "preserve in the hands of the clients, as opposed to lawyers, the power to settle
cases." ALI DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt. a. Current law provides that the deci-
sion to settle belongs to the client and that a client may revoke any previous grant of authority to
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most of the claims are relatively small in value, then the total amount
might be adequate for these claimants. But the total amount might
still be vastly inadequate for the minority of claims that are far more
serious, and these claimants will be unable to check attorney opportu-
nism as it affects them. The reporters will undoubtedly respond that
this was the purpose of providing that, when settlements distinguish
among separate categories of cases, supermajority approval within
each category is required. 76 However, for reasons explained below, 77
even a supermajority approval within each category does not protect
against attorney opportunism in aggregate settlements.
Even more important than protecting against inadequate settle-
ments is the aggregate settlement rule's function in protecting against
unfair allocations. The common attorney's collective fee will depend
on the total amount of the settlement, so the inadequate settlement
problem might not be widespread. 78 On the other hand, a common
attorney has little financial incentive to ensure horizontal equity
among the various clients.79 As a result, the attorney will not be moti-
vated to counter a defendant's desire to favor certain claimants over
others. For example, a defendant may favor customers, shareholders,
suppliers, employees, or even a specific group of employees over
others.80 Even if neither the plaintiffs' nor the defendant's attorneys
are biased in favor of certain claimants within the group, they will not
be motivated to expend the time and effort to individualize the settle-
ments in ways that many of the claimants might prefer.8' This leads to
"damage averaging," in which those with more serious injuries receive
less than they would have under an allocation that gives more weight
to individualized factors. 82
Moreover, the plaintiffs' attorney may be operating under financial
incentives that actively favor a biased allocation. For example, the
the lawyer to settle the client's case. Id. § 3.17 Reporters' Notes cmt. a (citing to both RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22(3) and Model Rule 1.2(a)). Whether
vesting decision-making power in a percentage of a group satisfies the requirements of the cur-
rent law in this respect is unclear. Even if it does, however, the criticism remains that the
supermajority approval requirement is inadequate to guard against attorney opportunism and
unfair allocations.
76. See ALI DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(b).
77. See infra Part IV.
78. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem Products-or,
Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1542
(1998) (attorneys "generally have a strong economic incentive to maximize the size of the settle-
ment fund").
79. See Erichson, supra note 46; see also Coffee, supra note 78, at 1542.
80. See Coffee, supra note 78, at 1546.
81. Id. at 1545.
82. Id.; accord Moore, supra note 7, at 168-69.
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attorney will earn more money from cases in which she is retained
directly, as opposed to those in which the attorney receives the case
from-and must share the contingent fee with-a referring attorney.83
Similarly, if the attorney uses a sliding scale contingent fee, as op-
posed to a fixed percentage, she will be motivated to distribute the
amounts in such a way as to maximize the total fee by keeping the
percentages higher in particular cases. 84 If the effectiveness of the set-
tlement depends upon a group vote, the attorney will be motivated to
please those in the majority, which will often be those with the small-
est and weakest claims. 85 Finally, there may be other situations in
which the attorney has special relationships with certain clients or
even third parties, such as unions, which would bias the attorney in
favor of a particular group of clients, such as union over non-union
employees.86
IV. THE PROPOSED SUPERMAJORITY APPROVAL REQUIREMENT
PROVIDES INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION TO CLIENTS
The reporters do not explain how supermajority approval guards
against inadequate settlements and unfair allocations. This Article as-
sumes that they believe that the individual monitoring provided by
75% of the claimants, informed of the settlement proposal's details,
will be sufficient to check the potential for attorney abuse. This might
be true when the supermajority claims are representative of all claims,
but this will not be the case when they are dissimilar, particularly
83. Erichson, supra note 46, at 572. This is precisely what may have occurred in a recent case
involving allegations that a plaintiffs' firm falsely told its clients that the settlement portions had
been individually negotiated with the defendant, when in fact they were determined solely by the
firm. The scheme was allegedly designed to hide the fact that "a major determinant in the size of
a client's share was whether he or she had retained [the firm] directly or been referred by an-
other firm." Anthony Lin, Trial Ordered Over Firm's Distribution of Fen-Phen Settlement. N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 28, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=11749
86238152. The firm "allegedly inflated the settlement payments of its direct clients because its
fees from those clients would not be reduced by referral fees." Id.
84. Erichson, supra note 46, at 572. Erichson also described how monitoring by claimants
creates incentives for defendants' counsel to offer settlements that the claimants are likely to
accept. Id. at 572-73.
85. See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 33, at 1531 ("[P]laintiffs with low-value claims greatly
outnumber those with high-value claims, [thus,] plaintiffs' attorneys feel some pressure to maxi-
mize the number of claimants who accept a particular settlement. This encourages plaintiffs'
attorneys to distribute settlement funds broadly within the claimant group.").
86. Cf Coffee, supra note 78, at 1546 (giving an example in the employment discrimination
class action context in which the class attorney's relationship with the union caused the attorney
to favor union over non-union class members).
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when the minority claims have substantially higher values than the
majority claims. 87
The reporters will undoubtedly argue that it is sufficient to require
supermajority approval within each category of a case when settle-
ments distinguish among them. However, aggregate settlements that
are unfairly biased in favor of some clients do not necessarily identify
separate categories of cases. For example, a settlement might provide
that the claimants will share equally in a lump sum offered by the
defendant. As a formal matter, there is only one category of claim-
ants, and the settlement treats them the same. But this Proposal fa-
vors claimants with less serious injuries over claimants with more
serious injuries, because their awards do not take individual damages
into account. 88 If the claimants with less serious injuries constitute
75% or more of the group, then they are in a position to bind those
with more serious injuries despite the obvious unfairness of the alloca-
tion. There are circumstances in which equal allocations, despite
some differences in the value of claims, might be appropriate.8 9 But,
unless the claimants who stand to lose the most agree to be bound by
an equal division, the allocation is presumptively unfair.
A similar situation occurs when attorneys allocate settlement sums
according to a matrix formula, a common technique in aggregate set-
tlements. The matrix accounts for a variety of relevant factors,
weighting each one differently.90 For example, the formula might con-
sider medical diagnosis, presence of certain symptoms, and docu-
mented progression of disease, as well as factors indicating the
strength of particular claims-such as evidence relating to both the
credibility of the claimant and causation-and the availability of vari-
87. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
88. Indeed, this is precisely what the problem of "damage averaging" means in class and non-
class aggregated settlements. Coffee, supra note 78, at 1545. See also Moore, supra note 7, at
163 n.91 (discussing the potential unfairness of the settlement in the Woburn case that was the
subject of the book A Civil Action, in which all the families received the same settlement amount
even though their injuries differed and "some of the families were likely to have their cases
dismissed").
89. When individual claims are small, it may be more efficient to distribute the settlement
equally rather than attempt to individualize each claimant's recovery. See Silver & Baker, supra
note 33, at 1522 (describing the common practice of making equal payments, "especially when
the sums involved are small"). Additionally, plaintiffs who know each other may be more will-
ing to share equally despite significant differences in their claims. See, e.g., N.J. Sup. Ct.
Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 616 (1988), available at http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/
ethicsdecisions/acpe/acp616_l.html (describing a toxic chemical case in which many plaintiffs
wanted to reject a "contingent blanket offer," but most of whom ultimately agreed to accept the
settlement when they found out that a number of their co-workers were going to have their
claims dismissed on statute of limitation grounds).
90. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 9, at 1789-80.
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ous defenses-such as whether there is an arguable statute of limita-
tions defense. Once again, as a formal matter, there is only one
category of claimants, and the settlement treats them the same. But
individual claimants may object that some factors are irrelevant, that
others are given too much or too little weight, or that additional, rele-
vant factors are not considered at all. The use of a matrix poses an
obvious risk of unfair allocations, and it is possible that those being
treated unfairly will be in the minority. Indeed, given the attorney's
financial incentive to ensure the effectiveness of the settlement, the
attorney will be biased in favor of the allocation most likely to gain
75% approval.
Aside from equal distributions and matrices, there are other ways in
which claimants may be treated unfairly when the settlement agree-
ment does not create different categories of cases. For example, the
defendant's attorney may agree to a settlement in which the plaintiffs'
attorney has allocated individual settlement values that add up to an
amount the defendant is willing to pay. The plaintiffs' attorney may
not use a matrix or any other formula to determine the individual set-
tlement values, instead relying on her own assessment of each case's
value. As long as the settlement agreement does not formally distin-
guish the way in which the claimants are treated, the attorney need
only convince 75 % of her clients that their settlement offers are fair in
order to bind the remaining claimants.
Finally, there is the question of how much information the claim-
ants will receive under § 3.17. As noted above, the text of the Propo-
sal suggests that claimants need not receive the same detailed
information about other claimants' settlements that is required under
the aggregate settlement rule.91 The aggregate settlement rule can,
and should, be interpreted to respect a client's desire for privacy, un-
less particular identifying information is important for other claimants
to evaluate the fairness of the settlement allocation.92 But the ALI
Draft Proposal appears to go well beyond that limited disclosure re-
striction. If § 3.17 requires only the specific information listed in its
text-which does not appear to include much, if any, detail regarding
what other claimants will receive 93-then it is difficult to see how the
75% supermajority approval requirement provides a meaningful
check on unfair allocations.
91. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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V. REINSTATING AN EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED
FAIRNESS HEARING WOULD NOT FIX THE PROBLEM
In an earlier draft, the reporters' proposal for limited judicial re-
view-available only if the claimant brings the challenge within ninety
days after being notified of the settlement's consummation 94-in-
cluded a provision under which courts could declare settlements unen-
forceable if they found that the settlement was "grossly unfair or
inadequate to the challenger. '95 Thus, by its own terms, the proposal
was not designed to ensure either the fairness or adequacy of aggre-
gate settlements, but only to protect against the most egregious abuses
and, even then, only when one or more claimants affirmatively exer-
cised her right to challenge the settlement.
There were other deficiencies in the proposal. For example, it re-
quired that the reviewing court give "substantial deference to the set-
tlement" and treat it as "presumptively fair and reasonable,"
regardless of the method of allocation and without any explanation
for either the deference or the presumption.96 Silver and Baker have
argued that a combination of uniform contingent fees, market regula-
tion of the choice of lawyers, and the threat of malpractice liability can
significantly reduce the risk of attorneys acting arbitrarily or oppor-
tunistically in allocating aggregate settlements, particularly when cou-
pled with variations of a majority voting rule, including supermajority
requirements.97 Although the current ALI Draft Proposal requires
supermajority approval, it does not require uniform contingent fees.98
As to the remaining risk reducers, Silver and Baker concede the diffi-
culty of proving a malpractice claim in many cases.99 Additionally,
their optimistic view of the role of the market in providing quality
control of mass tort lawyers is highly questionable. For example, culti-
vating a "reputation for superior performance" may steer some per-
centage of referrals to the most competent lawyers, 100 but referral
practices have been criticized, because the receiving lawyers may be
94. ALl PRELIM. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.18(a).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 3.18(c) & cmt. b.
97. See Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 773 (discussing "[o]ther protections [that] can sup-
plant the unanimity requirement" even in the absence of judicial review of an aggregate
settlement).
98. As noted above, mandatory uniform contingent fees would eliminate the plaintiffs' attor-
ney's incentive to favor claimants with whom the attorney has a direct retainer agreement over
those referred by other lawyers. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
99. See Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 777 (describing the difficulty for many plaintiffs to
establish that "his or her claim was worth more relative to other settled claims than he or she
received").
100. Id.
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offering the highest percentage or because they may have gained their
reputations primarily on the basis of mass marketing directly to the
public. 101
The reporters could have revised the earlier proposal to require
both uniform contingent fees and supermajority approval as condi-
tions of obtaining the court's deference to an aggregate settlement.
Even these conditions, however, would not justify either a presump-
tion that a settlement allocation is fair or the underlying standard that
the burden is on the challenger to prove that the settlement is grossly
unfair or inadequate. Uniform contingent fees may not be achievable,
at least where referral fees are permitted, and they would eliminate
only one of a number of incentives for common attorneys to favor one
group of clients over another.102 As for supermajority approval, that
requirement reduces, but cannot eliminate, "the number of clients in
danger of being sold out, ' 10 3 particularly when clients with smaller,
less credible claims vastly outnumber claimants with more serious
claims.104
Aside from the unwarranted presumption of fairness and the refusal
to provide relief unless a settlement is grossly unfair, the earlier pro-
posal was inadequate in several respects. First, the claimant had to
file the challenge "within 90 days of receiving actual notice of the con-
summation of a settlement."' 1 5 Ninety days is almost certainly inade-
quate for a claimant not only to decide that she believes the
settlement is inadequate or unfair-which, under the current rule, is
all a client needs to do in order to reject the settlement-but also to
find a lawyer with the required knowledge, experience, and willing-
ness to file the challenge on such short notice.
Even without the short time frame, it is unclear what incentives
competent lawyers have to take on these challenges. The proposal
provided that they might be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs if they prevailed, 10 6 but there would be no guarantee that they
101. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 46, at 537 & n.63 (reporting criticisms of some plaintiffs'
lawyers). Professor Erichson concluded that, "[i]n general, however, it is reasonable to expect
that the incentives of the referral market would generally channel referral cases to lawyers com-
petent to handle them and positioned to take advantage of economies of scale and opportunities
for bargaining leverage." Id. at 537-38.
102. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
103. Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 778.
104. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
105. ALl PRELIM. DRAFT No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.18(a).
106. Section 3.18(f) provided that the common attorney who negotiates a settlement that is
later determined to be unenforceable "may be required to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs incurred by the challenging claimant," but the reporters did not explain why the challeng-
ing claimant is not automatically entitled to receive these fees and costs or what factors should
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would prevail. Moreover, winning would not be easy given both the
presumption of adequacy and fairness and the need to prove gross
injustice. There is also no guarantee that attorneys who agree to re-
present plaintiffs in mass tort lawsuits on a contingency fee basis will
prevail, yet mass tort plaintiffs often find attorneys to represent them.
There, the attorneys stand to earn substantial fees if they prevail or
reach a negotiated settlement, and they can spread what can be sub-
stantial costs among a large number of clients. Here, however, the
amount that the attorneys stand to earn is considerably less,'0 7 and
they will be unable to spread the costs of proving inadequacy or unfair
allocation among such a large group.
How would these lawyers demonstrate that a settlement agreement
was either grossly inadequate or unfair? Under the current aggregate
settlement rule, a client's mere suspicion that the settlement is unfair
is sufficient to warrant the client's refusal to be bound by its terms.
But, under the earlier draft proposal, the claimant would have had to
prove inadequacy or unfair allocation, which individual clients are un-
likely to have the requisite evidence to prove. Further, it was unclear
from the proposal whether, and to what extent, they would be entitled
to formal discovery-from both the common attorney and the defen-
dant's attorney-concerning all of the information necessary to prove
their claim.
VI. NEITHER SUPERMAJORITY APPROVAL NOR A FAIRNESS
HEARING PROVIDES FOR UNIQUE CLIENT PREFERENCES
AND INDIVIDUAL CLIENT AUTONOMY
According to Erichson, the aggregate settlement rule not only pro-
vides a means of monitoring the lawyers, but it also "enables clients to
effectuate individualistic preferences."'1 ° 8 In other words, "[e]ven as-
suming perfect equity in the allocation of settlement funds ... some
clients may rationally choose to accept the settlement while others ra-
tionally choose to reject it, based on different approaches to settle-
determine when they are recoverable. ALl PRELIM. DRAFr No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.18(f) (em-
phasis added).
107. Undoubtedly, as with most fee-shifting provisions, the prevailing attorney's reasonable
fees would be determined by the lodestar method, under which fees are determined on the basis
of a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). In these cases,
however, the work would be limited in scope, particularly if discovery of information surround-
ing the settlement is limited. Even if the challenging claimant or claimants agreed to pay the
attorney a contingent fee, success in the litigation would not result in an award of damages
unless the common attorney offered a sum of money in return for the claimant dropping her
challenge to the settlement, and the total amount of fees would still be small because of the low
number of claimants involved.
108. Erichson, supra note 46, at 573.
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ment decisionmaking, different levels of risk tolerance, and different
objectives and priorities in the litigation.' 0 9 No doubt the reporters
will respond that it is also rational for clients to waive their rights
under the aggregate settlement rule in return for increased efficiencies
and bargaining leverage that benefit the group as a whole. Further,
they will argue that the law should support unique client preferences
by respecting a client's choice to rely on both the integrity of the indi-
vidual lawyer and a limited form of judicial review to protect them
from inadequate and unfair settlements. 10
These arguments are unconvincing. The increased efficiencies and
bargaining leverage gained through aggregating claims are already
available to the vast majority of claimants under the current rule."'
In any event, client waivers obtained under the Draft Proposal are not
likely to reflect true client "preferences" in most cases. Particularly in
mass tort lawsuits, many of the clients are unsophisticated and inexpe-
rienced users of legal services." 2 They are unlikely to have an ongo-
ing relationship with the common attorney and will probably select
her, or even a referring lawyer, on the basis of mass marketing."13
Their preference to waive will undoubtedly be shaped almost entirely
by the attorney. They will have little basis upon which to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the attorney, the risk of conscious, or even uncon-
scious, bias in the settlement allocation, or the deficiencies of any lim-
ited judicial review. The attorney will be strongly motivated to
persuade them to sign the waiver and will probably refuse to represent
them unless they do so. In such circumstances, true client preferences
and autonomy are respected by allowing clients the freedom to accept
or reject an aggregate settlement offer only after ensuring that they
have received the information that they need to evaluate its fairness
and adequacy.
109. Id.
110. This is the thrust of the position that Silver and Baker put forth in their articles cited
above. See Silver & Baker, supra note 7; Silver & Baker, supra note 33.
111. See supra Part II.
112. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 7, at 181 (discussing client waivers in mass tort claims). Of
course, the aggregate settlement rule also applies in cases involving more sophisticated clients,
typically those involving contract, rather than tort, claims. See, e.g., Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson
Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006) (applying Rule 1.8(g) to an attorney representing 154
individual franchisees suing a tax preparation franchisor for improper retention of funds in a
loan risk pool). Whether it would be desirable-or even possible-to limit the proposed modifi-
cations to cases involving sophisticated and experienced users of legal services is beyond the
scope of this Article. This would require reviewing an attorney's conduct on a case-by-case
basis, which would seriously impinge upon the ability of both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers
to know in advance when aggregate settlements are permissible.
113. See Erichson, supra note 46, at 534-39.
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But what of the reporters' response that "waivers are valid in a vari-
ety of areas in which important rights are at stake," and thus a waiver
that is "knowingly and voluntarily made, is in writing, [and] is signed
by the claimant after full disclosure" should be binding?" 4 Isn't the
refusal to permit clients to waive their rights under the aggregate set-
tlement rule unnecessarily paternalistic?" l5 Although there is an un-
deniable element of paternalism in refusing to honor client
preferences to execute these waivers, such paternalism is war-
ranted." 16 Indeed, it is entirely consistent with other aspects of the law
governing attorney-client relations, including law that was recently ap-
proved by the ALI in its Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers. " 17
VII. THE ALI DRAFT PROPOSAL IS A RADICAL DEPARTURE
FROM THE CURRENT LAW OF LAWYERING
In the current ALI Draft Proposal, the reporters say little about the
autonomy argument. Instead, they merely note that litigants are per-
mitted to waive important rights "in a variety of areas."' 8 It is note-
worthy, however, that the examples they cite are not from the law of
lawyering, but rather primarily from constitutional cases in which liti-
gants were permitted to waive their due process rights to notice, hear-
ing, or trial."t 9 But the standard for determining when waivers are
binding in constitutional cases is not necessarily the same standard
applied in other contexts. Both federal and state governments are
free to offer, and commonly do offer, protections beyond those
granted under their constitutions, including nonwaiveable rights to
void certain agreements likely to have been made on the basis of ei-
114. ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt. a.
115. See Silver & Baker, supra note 7, at 769; Silver & Baker, supra note 33, at 1503 n.125.
116. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple
Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Con fusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211,
233-40 (1982) (discussing justifications for paternalism in the context of the general conflicts of
interest rule).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
118. ALI DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt. a.
119. Id. at § 3.17 Reporters' Notes, cmt. a. The reporters cite to cases holding that litigants
may waive procedural due-process protections and note that criminal defendants who enter
guilty pleas thereby waive their rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses, and to have
the case against them proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. They also cite a federal statute
permitting military personnel to waive various rights, including the right to terminate residential
and automobile leases. Id. They cite only one example in the context of the law of lawyering: a
recent ABA opinion that somewhat facilitates the ability of sophisticated clients to give advance
waivers of conflicts. Id. It is notable, however, that the ABA opinion they cited makes many
advance waivers nonconsentable, particularly when the clients are unsophisticated, like most
mass tort plaintiffs. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005).
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ther a lack of information, unequal bargaining power, or coercion. 120
This is particularly true in the law of lawyering.
According to the Restatement, "[a] lawyer is an agent, to whom
clients entrust matters, property, and information, which may be of
great importance and sensitivity, and whose work is usually not sub-
ject to detailed client supervision because of its complexity.' 21 Fur-
ther, "[b]ecause those characteristics of the client-lawyer relationship
make clients vulnerable to harm, and because of the importance to the
legal system of faithful representation, the law ... provides a number
of safeguards for clients beyond those generally provided to
principals. '122
Consider the number of situations in which the current law of lawy-
ering refuses to honor client preferences in order to protect clients
from overreaching attorneys. Under Rule 1.2(c), lawyers may not
limit the scope of representation, even with the client's informed con-
sent, unless the limitation is "reasonable. ' 123 Similarly, under Rule
1.5(a), lawyers may not charge "unreasonable" legal fees. 24 Under
Rule 1.7(b), lawyers may not represent clients with conflicting inter-
ests, even with their clients' informed consent, unless the lawyer "rea-
sonably believes that [she] will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client."'' 25 Under Rule 1.8,
lawyers may not do any of the following: engage in business transac-
tions with clients unless the terms are objectively "fair and reasona-
ble"; 126 prepare instruments giving the lawyer a substantial gift;127
make agreements giving the lawyer literary or media rights based on
120. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (absent Board action to prescribe certain
regulations, no waivers are permitted allowing rescission when a security interest is taken in a
consumer's principal residence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-36 (West 2001) (retail installment
sales contracts may not contain a provision purporting to waive certain defenses in actions
against seller). Cf. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(2000 & Supp. 2003); Family & Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000 & Supp. 2003)
(nonwaivable right to family leave).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14, Introductory Note
(2000).
122. Id.
123. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19 & cmt. c (2007).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2007). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 & cmt. b (2007).
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) (2007). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122(2)(c) & cmt. g(iv) (2007).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2007). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 & cmt. b (2007).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(c) (2007). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127(1) & cmt. b (2007).
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information relating to the representation; 128 make an agreement pro-
spectively limiting the lawyer's liability for malpractice, unless the cli-
ent is independently represented; 29 or have sexual relations with a
client. 130 These limitations to client consent are not free from criti-
cism,1 3 1 but they have been widely adopted. 32 More importantly,
they were recently approved by the ALI itself when it adopted the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. 33
Advance waivers have been singled out as particularly problematic.
Consider Comment 22 to Rule 1.7:
Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts
that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b)
[which requires both the client's informed consent and the lawyer's
reasonable belief that she will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation]. The effectiveness of such waivers is gener-
ally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably under-
stands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more
comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representa-
tions that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable ad-
verse consequences of those representations, the greater the
likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding.
Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict
with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily
will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is
general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffec-
tive, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have un-
derstood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the
client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is
reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise,
such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the
client is independently represented by other counsel in giving con-
sent .... In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(d) (2007). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF rHE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 36(3) & cmt. d (2007).
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(h)(1) (2007). Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54(2) & cmt. b (2007) (providing no such exception. even for
independently represented clients).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.80) (2007). Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(3) & cmt. e (2007) (providing no per se ban but prohibiting
sexual relations when such relations would "undermine the client's case, abuse the client's de-
pendence on the lawyer, or create risk to the lawyer's independent judgment," such as in divorce
cases.
131. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, When It Comes to Sex with Clients, Whom Do You Trust:
Nanny or the ABA?. 19 GPSoLo 36 (2002) (urging the ABA to reject the then-proposed Model
Rule 1.8(j), which would have prohibited most sexual relationships with clients).
132. See Charts Comparing Professional Conduct Rules as Adopted by States to ABA Model
Rules, supra note 37.
133. See supra note 117.
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circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make
the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b). 13 4
The ALl Draft Proposal clearly contemplates a form of advance
waiver, not necessarily of the right to representation free of conflicting
interests, 135 but rather of the client's right to accept or reject a settle-
ment offer after receiving appropriate information as required under
the aggregate settlement rule. 36 It is difficult to imagine that attor-
neys could provide disclosures at the outset of their representations
that would be adequate for unsophisticated mass tort clients to rea-
sonably understand the material risks of such waivers. At the time of
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2007). Accord RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. d (2007).
135. Attorneys who represent multiple clients with similar claims in mass tort lawsuits typi-
cally do have such conflicts of interest, particularly if they are negotiating or anticipate negotiat-
ing an aggregate settlement of those claims. See Moore, supra note 7, at 177. The propriety of
the representation itself, even with conflict waivers, is governed by Rule 1.7 and is beyond the
scope of this Article. In any event, it is clear that waivers under Rule 1.7 are separate from the
type of waiver the reporters contemplate with respect to the protections offered under Rule
1.8(g).
136. Even in the absence of Rule 1.8(g), the client would have these rights under Rule 1.2(a)
(providing that it is the client's decision whether to accept or reject a settlement offer) and 1.4(b)
(providing that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation"). See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 1.4(b) (2007). According to the Restatement, clients can authorize
an attorney to accept a settlement offer on their behalf, but they can also revoke that authority
at any time prior to acceptance, and they cannot effectively create an irrevocable authority to
settle in favor of the attorney. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 22(3) (2007). These limitations on waiveability derive from agency law, which generally pro-
vides that an agent may not act contrary to a principal's instructions, even when those instruc-
tions are contrary to an irrevocable contract between the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 118 cmt. b (1958). In a prior draft, the reporters argued that the recognized exception
for agents "possessing a power given as security" applies in the case of aggregate settlement
waivers, even one purporting to give the lawyer alone the right to bind the client to a settlement,
because the purpose of the waiver was to protect the interests of other claimants. See ALI
PRELIM. DRAVr No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.17, Reporters' Notes to cmt. a. This argument may be
correct as a matter of agency law, but it ignores the additional protections provided under fiduci-
ary (as opposed to contract) law, particularly the law governing lawyers. According to the Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, an agreement between a lawyer and a client
that limits "a duty that a lawyer would otherwise owe to the client" is not enforceable unless
"the terms of the limitation are reasonable in the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19 (2007); accord Moore, supra note 7, at 175-76. Apparently
conceding the weakness of the argument they made in the prior draft, the reporters now recog-
nize that "under prevailing ethics rules, a lawyer may not obtain a nonrevocable assignment of
the client's individual authority to decide whether to settle a case and for what amount." ALl
DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17 cmt. a. They further argue, however, that this rule is not
violated when the authority to settle "is not given to counsel but, instead, remains with the
collective clients, who may act to accept a settlement pursuant to a waiver only" in accordance
with the 75% approval requirement. Id. (emphasis in original). It is unclear whether the
supermajority approval requirement changes the analysis under either Rule 1.2(a) or agency law,
because the client would still be relinquishing the right to make the final decision regarding
settlement.
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retention-when the Draft Proposal contemplates many waivers will
be obtainedI 37-clients will typically have little idea of the likely value
of their claims, how their claims will compare to the claims of others,
and how various methods of allocating a lump sum settlement are
likely to affect them. 138 Such information is more readily available the
further along the lawsuits proceed, but, if the Proposal is modified to
require that waivers become effective only if obtained much later in
the representation, the burden of fully informing the clients of the ma-
terial risks of an impending aggregate settlement will be virtually
identical to the burden of providing relevant information after the set-
tlement has been negotiated. At this point, the only reason to allow
the waivers is to avoid the possibility of strategic holdouts, but the
reporters have yet to demonstrate that this problem alone is suffi-
ciently serious to warrant abrogation of the aggregate settlement
rule.1 39
VIII. IN THE ABSENCE OF Ex ANTE WAIVERS UNDER § 3.17,
JUDICIAL APPROVAL Is AN INSUFFICIENT SUBSTITUTE
FOR THE AGGREGATE SET'LEMENT RULE
In addition to ex ante waivers under § 3.17, the reporters propose in
§ 3.19 that a plaintiffs' attorney who receives an aggregate settlement
offer "may seek approval for the fairness and adequacy of such a set-
tlement before a court of competent jurisdiction in the state where the
original attorney-client agreement was formed. ' 140 The approval
would extend only to the claims that are presented to the court for
review, and the attorney would be forced not only to "affirmatively
demonstrate the fairness of the proposed settlement," but also to
"provide a compelling explanation for why a waiver was not secured
pursuant to § 3.17. ' 141 The reporters do not explain why such an ex-
137. See ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.17(c).
138. See, e.g., Silver & Baker, supra note 33, at 1505:
[Plaintiffs have] no idea what the size of [their] ownership interest in a litigation group
is and, moreover, [have] no objective way of finding out. Plaintiffs typically do not
learn how large their shares are until they receive settlement offers for approval....
Having little or no idea how much their claims are worth, clients pay their lawyers in
part to provide an assessment.
Id.
139. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
140. ALl DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 3.19(a).
141. Id. § 3.19 cmt. b. For reasons that are not explained, the text itself states that the lawyers
who seek judicial approval "bear the burden of establishing that efforts to secure direct approval
from clients were unavailing and why the terms of § 3.17 could not be satisfied without judicial
approval," but does not state, as does the comment, that the lawyers bear the burden of estab-
lishing the fairness of the proposed settlement. Id. § 3.19(a).
[Vol. 57:395
AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT RULE
ception to the aggregate settlement rule is either necessary or desira-
ble. In an earlier draft, they suggested that a potentially "compelling
reason" not to secure an advance waiver under § 3.17 was that the
affected claimants did not meet the numerosity or amount in contro-
versy requirements of that section, 142 thereby implying that ex ante
waivers were obtained. But the reporters did not explain what is com-
pelling about such a case, especially given that the reporters them-
selves expressly designed these requirements to pinpoint
circumstances in which the aggregate settlement rule is thought to be
unworkable.
Moreover, the reporters do not limit the exception to cases in which
some form of ex ante waiver has been obtained. What possible reason
could there be to permit a court to impose a settlement over the ob-
jection of one or more of the claimants in a non-class aggregation in
which there is no ability-either ex ante or ex post-to opt out of the
group settlement? It cannot be the burden of obtaining informed con-
sent to the terms of the settlement, because § 3.19(b) provides that,
prior to invoking this form of judicial review, "claimants' counsel must
use all reasonable efforts to notify all affected claimants and provide
such claimants an opportunity to participate in the judicial
proceedings." 143
The only reason for imposing settlements in the absence of ex ante
waivers is that the attorney believes the settlement is so good that any
claimant who objects must be acting either irrationally or strategically.
But it is not necessarily irrational to reject a settlement that someone
else, even a court, believes is adequate and fair, given that individual
preferences vary so widely, 144 and the reporters cannot possibly con-
template that courts will determine whether individual claimants are
acting irrationally given their own unique preferences. Even if a
claimant is acting irrationally or strategically, attorneys have no right
to override a client's rejection of a settlement offer through court ap-
proval, merely because the attorney purports to know what is best for
the client or has other clients who want to accept the offer. For re-
porters who place a high value on the client's right to autonomous
decision making,1 45 this particular proposal is both unjustifiably pater-
nalistic and contrary to the attorney's duty of loyalty to individual cli-
142. ALl PRELIM. DRAFr No. 4, supra note 1, § 3.19 cmt. b. The current draft gives no expla-
nation for the removal of this language from the comment.
143. Id. § 3.19(b).
144. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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ents, including the duty to abide by each client's decision concerning
the objectives of the representation.
IX. CONCLUSION
The goals of the ALI's Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litiga-
tion are laudable, not only because they recommend procedures to
better handle class action lawsuits, but also because they attempt to
clarify and improve non-class aggregations, including the negotiation
and settlement of mass tort claims. The aggregate settlement rule has
spawned much confusion, making it difficult for both plaintiffs' and
defendants' attorneys, while acting in good faith, to conform their
conduct to the rule. One of the primary difficulties has been the lack
of a clear definition of what constitutes an aggregate settlement for
purposes of triggering the rule's requirements. Here, the ALI Draft
Proposal offers a definition that is not only clear, but also both princi-
pled and workable.
Another problem has been the failure to articulate precisely what
information the plaintiffs' attorneys must disclose to the claimants
concerning the nature of all of the claims being settled. The ALI
Draft Proposal endorses both recent changes to the ABA Model rules
and an opinion of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Eth-
ics, which sets forth a number of specific matters the attorney must
disclose. In this respect, the Proposal is commendable. Unfortu-
nately, the Proposal does not clarify an important ambiguity under the
current rule regarding the attorney's ability to protect clients' privacy
interests when detailed information, such as clients' names, may not
be necessary for other clients to monitor the fairness of settlement
allocations. Hopefully, the reporters will address this concern in fu-
ture drafts.
The ALI Draft Proposal is seriously defective, however, in the re-
porters' efforts to allow plaintiffs' attorneys to bypass the aggregate
settlement rule, primarily by having clients execute advance waivers
of their right to its protections. The reporters have neither offered
evidence that the rule significantly impedes the settlement of mass
lawsuits nor drafted provisions that provide sufficient alternative pro-
tection against inadequate and unfair settlements. Although purport-
ing to honor client preferences and autonomy, the reporters ignore
the danger that overreaching attorneys will shape client preferences at
a time when the clients have insufficient information to assess whether
advance waivers are really necessary to obtain the benefits of collec-
tive litigation. The current law of lawyering recognizes that clients are
often vulnerable and thus provides numerous safeguards for clients
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beyond those generally provided by other law. One of those safe-
guards is the current aggregate settlement rule. The burden is on the
reporters to justify significant changes to that rule, and they have
failed to meet that burden.
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